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We use a randomised experiment in Kenya to analyse how smallholder farmers respond to 
receiving a free hybrid crop insurance product, conditional on purchasing certiﬁed seeds. 
We ﬁnd that farmers increase effort—increasing total investments and taking more land 
in production. In addition to adopting more certiﬁed seeds, they also invest more in com- 
plementary inputs such as fertilizer and hired-in farm-machinery and non-farm labour. We 
ﬁnd limited evidence of a change in farming intensity. For example, there is no evidence of 
‘crowding-out’ of effort or inputs on a per-hectare basis, even if the indemnity-based com- 
ponent of the insurance product potentially gives rise to asymmetric information problems 
(moral hazard). We also document that ex post willingness to pay for the insurance prod- 
uct has increased for the treatment group. This suggests that learning about the beneﬁts of 
(subsidized) insurance outweighs any anchoring effects on the zero price during the pilot 
study. 
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 1. Introduction 
Agriculture is the key sector for poverty reduction and sustainable development in Africa in the twenty-ﬁrst century, and
remains an essential component of most development strategies ( World Bank, 2008 ). It employs approximately two-thirds
of the labour force and generates on average one-third of gross domestic product (GDP) growth ( Brune et al., 2016 ). 
In order to kick-start a process of agricultural development farmers should increase usage of modern agricultural tech-
niques, including improved seeds and chemical inputs such as fertilizer. For example, improved seeds have the potential
to increase income and improve rural livelihoods (e.g. Just and Zilberman, 1983 ). However, it is well-known that adoption
of modern inputs among African farmers remains incomplete due to lack of information, lack of liquidity to purchase in-
puts, and (perceived) risks associated with adoption ( Feder et al., 1985 ). 1 More recent explanations for low adoption rates∗ Corresponding author at: Wageningen University, Development Economics, Hollandseweg 1, 6709KN Wageningen, the Netherlands. 
E-mail address: francesco.cecchi@wur.nl (F. Cecchi). 
1 For instance, according to the Uganda Bureau of Statistics, as of 2006, only 6% Ugandan farmers were using improved seeds while a much lower 
percentage used inorganic fertilizers ( Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2007 ). Further, dropout rates are high among farmers who initially adopt improved 
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 are based on insights from behavioral economics ( Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010 ) or the existence of low-quality counterfeit
inputs ( Bold et al., 2017 ). 
Since agricultural output in rain-fed African agriculture varies with the vagaries of the weather, potential yield beneﬁts
associated with modern inputs are not guaranteed. Indeed, adopting smallholders may lose their ‘investment’ which may
pose a threat to their livelihoods if they live close to subsistence levels. While poor households may be able to informally
manage risks via community-based insurance (e.g., Breman, 1974; Scott, 1976 ) or reciprocal lending within social networks,
such strategies are unlikely to adequately deal with systemic risks such as weather shocks (e.g., Townsend, 1994; Udry, 1990,
1994 ). Hence it is no surprise that many African smallholders opt for (traditional) inputs promising low expected yields but
little variability in returns ( Mobarak and Rosenzweig, 2013, Karlan et al., 2014; Kurosaki and Fafchamps, 2002 ). 
What scope is there for formal insurance systems to reduce farmers’ vulnerability to risk, and induce an increase in
adoption of new technologies and improved seeds? A small literature is now developing to explore these issues, pointing to
potential ex ante (investment) and ex post (income constraint) effects (e.g., Cai and Song, 2017; De Janvry et al., 2014; Karlan
et al., 2014; Hill et al., 2019 ). 2 However the evidence on potential welfare gains remains ambiguous, and policy choices
regarding whether or not to subsidize insurance products remain debated. Part of the lack of progress is explained by the
simple fact that uptake of (unsubsidized) insurance remains very limited among African smallholders. This is true even for
recent innovative products based on index insurance, where pay-outs are linked to local rainfall or vegetation growth as
opposed to individual damages. While the transaction costs associated with index-based insurance are much lower than
with traditional indemnity-based insurance products, uptake rates typically do not exceed ten per cent of the population.
Ahmed et al. (2018 , p.32) write “... there are literally no examples of developing-country index insurance pilot programs leaping
to scale as market-based products .” Also refer to Cole and Xiong (2017) and Carter et al. (2017) for recent overviews of
experiences with index insurance. 3 
In this study we probe the latent demand for formal insurance among a population that heretofore had no access to
insurance, and aim to analyse whether formal insurance ‘crowds-in’ the use of modern inputs. We present evidence based
on a randomized controlled trial to measure whether providing free multi-peril crop insurance, conditional on adoption of a
pre-speciﬁed set of improved inputs, achieves the following: 1) increase the uptake of improved seeds; 2) affect the uptake
of complementary modern inputs; and 3) provide a vehicle facilitating learning about the beneﬁts of agricultural insurance.
In our treatment arm, smallholders receive multi-peril insurance at zero cost if they purchase improved seeds of (one
of) the following four crops: maize, sorghum, soya and sunﬂower. Our insurance product combines elements of index insur-
ance and indemnity-based insurance (see below). We distinguish between effects on the targeted seeds (a direct effect) and
effects on complementary inputs such as fertilizer, herbicides, labor and machinery (an indirect effect). Crowding-in effects
may occur due to production complementarities (synergy effects) or because risk averse smallholders are shielded from par-
ticularly ‘bad outcomes’ with near-zero returns in which they run the risk of losing some of their assets. That is; insurance
increases the risk-adjusted rate of return of investments in inputs. Crowding-out effects may also occur. This could happen
if the indemnity-based component of our insurance product invites moral hazard among farmers. The effect of insurance on
input use is therefore theoretically ambiguous. 
Our work is related to several other studies. Very little work has been done on the ‘bundling’ of insurance. Giné and
Yang (2009) ﬁnd that bundling insurance with credit intended to promote the adoption of new crop technology adversely
affected demand for the loan. The reason, they argue, is that limited liability with respect to credit implicitly provides
insurance, so that adding a formal insurance component simply adds to the cost of obtaining credit. Karlan et al. (2014) also
argue against bundling credit and insurance, arguing that microﬁnance organisations should focus on providing the latter if
the aim is to generate an investment response. 4 We are not aware of any work on the bundling of insurance and agricultural
inputs. One diﬃculty is that, compared to credit, agricultural inputs are far from homogenous. Studying insurance bundled
with a speciﬁc seed variety, for instance, will be inherently dependent on the very characteristics of that variety, and thus
have limited external validity. We address this generalisability issue by allowing farmers to bundle the insurance to ‘any’
seed variety certiﬁed by the Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Service (KEPHIS), for the four most commonly farmed crops in
the area of study. This includes virtually any certiﬁed improved seeds our sample of smallholder farmers would have access
too. The paper also speaks to the issue of subsidizing inputs. According to behavioural economic theory, short-term subsidies
may invite opposing effects on long-term adoption. Short-term subsidies may facilitate learning about the beneﬁts of new
technologies, but also invite ‘anchoring’ on low (or zero) prices which would reduce future demand (e.g. Dupas, 2014a,b ).
The net effect is again theoretically ambiguous. agricultural technologies ( Kijima et al., 2011 ). Gollin et al. (2005) estimate that adoption of modern varieties of maize was limited to 17% of the maize 
farmers, which may be compared to 57% in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 90% in East and South East Asia and the Paciﬁc. 
2 Relatedly, but focusing on a non-ﬁnancial approach to reducing downside risk, Emerick et al. (2016) document that a ﬂood-tolerant new rice variety 
positively affects usage of labor-intensive planting methods and fertilizer. 
3 Cole et al. (2014), Casaburi and Willis (2018) and Belissa et al. (2019) demonstrate that demand for index insurance can be increased by complementary 
interventions aimed at generating trust in the insurance product or overcoming liquidity constraints when premiums are due. Karlan et al. (2014) also 
provide evidence for considerable demand for index insurance. 
4 Theoretical work by Carter et al. (2016) also emphasizes potentially ambiguous welfare effects of combining credit and insurance, depending on the 
nature of the risk and the presence of collateral. 
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 We report three main results. First, bundling modern inputs with free insurance results in some extra uptake of improved
seeds. This suggests positive willingness to pay for the insurance product. However, it also appears as if the latent demand
for formal insurance is modest: uptake of the improved seeds does increase, but by less than the implicit value of the sub-
sidy for one acre of land. Second, the bundle (improved seed and free insurance) enhanced the uptake of additional mod-
ern inputs and increased the area people cleared for farming. This suggests there are either production complementarities,
or that extra demand can be leveraged by reducing downside production risk. Third, we use a Becker–DeGroot–Marschak
auction design (BDM) to elicit willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the same insurance product during the following year in an
incentive-compatible fashion. We document greater willingness to pay among the treated, which we interpret as evidence
of a positive learning effect. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we explain the insurance product, and randomisation
procedure. We show that randomisation worked by presenting balance tests. Section 3 sketches our identiﬁcation strategy
and presents the main outcome variables. Empirical results are presented in Section 4 . Section 5 summarises the main
conclusions, discusses the main limitations, and provides avenues for further research. 
2. Context and experiment 
We offer free multi-peril insurance (see below) to a random group of Kenyan smallholders who purchase improved seeds
for speciﬁc crops. The improved seed varieties were locally available at market prices, and certiﬁed by KEPHIS—the national
authority monitoring seed quality. The study was motivated by two observations regarding the behaviour of smallholders in
our study region: (i) uptake of unsubsidized farming insurance products is very limited (nearly absent) in our study area, 5
and at current rates is unlikely to provide an impetus to local agricultural development; and (ii) the adoption of improved
crop varieties is low, levelling at less than 50% of farmers in our study region and covering less than 25% of land. The
majority of farmers prefer to grow traditional varieties with lower expected yield. Farmers adopting modern varieties are
typically growing traditional varieties alongside the modern ones. 6 
We wish to explore whether there is latent demand for formal insurance products. By offering free insurance, but making
it conditional on purchasing improved seed, we can obtain a very rough proxy for the latent demand for insurance. The price
paid for improved inputs now enables the farmer to kill two birds with one stone: she effectively purchases both insurance
as well as modern inputs. If the promise of free insurance does not increase the adoption of modern seed, the implied value
of insurance must be very low. By comparing the uptake of improved crop varieties between the treated and control group
we obtain a measure of willingness to pay for formal insurance. 
However, while our estimated treatment effect provides a proxy for the value of insurance, it is not straightforward to
interpret its exact meaning without making additional assumptions. This can be shown with a very simple model. Suppose
that people are homogeneous in their WTP for insurance ( v ) but heterogeneous in their WTP for improved varieties ( i ).
Assume a cumulative distribution function for the distribution of WTP for improved varieties, i ∼G ( ), and that farmers have
to choose whether to buy improved varieties or not (binary choice). The price of the improved variety is ﬁxed, at price p .
Farmers from the control group will buy if i > p and farmers from the treatment group will buy if i + v > p . The difference
in uptake between the two groups is simply G ( p ) –G ( p − v ), and depends on the shape of G as well as on the variable of
interest ( v ), 
The main hypothesis that we test: 
Hypothesis 1: There is positive willingness to pay for formal insurance, so compared to the control group uptake of modern
varieties in the treatment group will be higher. 
We also wish to explore whether uptake of the improved seed plus insurance bundle affects the uptake of non-seed
modern inputs. As mentioned, production complementarities and the elimination (or reduction) of downside risk may crowd
in additional inputs, but moral hazard may have the opposite effect. Since the indemnity-based component of the hybrid
product is relative small, however, we expect that problems due to asymmetric information will be relatively unimportant
in this context. 
Hypothesis 2: Farmers induced to buy a bundle with improved seeds and formal insurance are more likely to also invest in
the use of complementary inputs. 
Finally we predict that offering a free insurance product may facilitate learning about the beneﬁts of insurance and
contribute to building trust in the product and insurance company. In theory, reference-dependent utility may depress WTP
after short-term subsidization of goods and services, but the literature suggests that the learning effect tends to dominate
the anchoring effect. Hence we expect willingness to pay for insurance in follow up periods to increase. 
Hypothesis 3: Subsidized access to insurance increases future demand for insurance. 5 While we cannot exclude that other farmers in the area purchased insurance, none of the participants in our study bought crop or weather insurance 
in the previous year. 
6 However, there is some ambiguity as to the exact meaning of the concept ‘traditional varieties’. Much of the traditional maize seed used by farmers 
everywhere in Africa is a mix of old and modern. 
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Table 1 
Premiums of MPCI per acre for different crops. 
Soya bean Sorghum Sunﬂower Maize 
Cost of production per acre 11,300 11,500 4900 14,500 
Expected yield (kg/acre) 1800 2000 1000 1500 
Insured at 65% guarantee Sum insured (KSh/acre) 7345 7475 3185 9425 
Gross premium 6% 441 449 191 566 
Levies 1.98 2.02 0.86 2.54 
Stamp duty 40 40 40 40 
Net premium (Ksh) 483 491 232 609 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2.1. The insurance product 
We consider an unusual insurance product. The insurance product is made available for free but obtaining it is condi-
tional on the purchase of certiﬁed seeds. The insurance is underwritten individually by farmers and not transferable. The
insurance coverage is speciﬁcally designed and provided by APA Insurance Ltd and Acre Africa Ltd for the purpose of the
experiment. 7 Our hybrid insurance product combines index-based insurance for some risks and indemnity-based insurance
for others. It therefore falls in the category of Multi-Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI). 
The weather index insurance (WII) component includes both rainfall deﬁcits (covering three stages: germination, vege-
tative and ﬂowering) and excess rainfall during the entire growth season. Weather data are ground-based rainfall measure-
ments. The effective date of inception starts when a minimum of 10 mm of rain within a ﬁve-day period (as captured by
the respective weather stations) is recorded. The indemnity component provides coverage against ﬂooding, hail, frost, ﬁre,
windstorm, and uncontrollable pests and diseases. Inception of MPCI starts after a ﬁeld inspector carries out a crop stand
inspection. Furthermore, risk is monitored during the cover period through periodic farm visits in sampled farms within
deﬁned insurance units. In case of a ‘total loss’ necessitating replanting, payments are made to facilitate on-time replanting
if the season permits. Otherwise, at harvest an indemnity is paid guaranteeing 65% of the long-term production average (i.e.
the product uses a deductible of 35% of the insured amount). 
The study team subsidized the full insurance premium for adopting farmers. The premium paid to the insurance company
varied depending on the crop—from 232 KSh for Sunﬂower to 609 KSh per acre for maize (where 100 Ksh ≈ USD 1). Since
standard seed packages cover only part of an acre (one acre of maize requires four standard packages), it was also possible
to insure part of an acre – the land equivalent of the number of packets purchased. We did not impose any upper bound on
the number of acres (packages) that could be purchased. Table 1 breaks down the premium for the four crops as estimated
by APA. 
Farmers were not informed about the value of the different insurance subsidies, but received two trainings about the
workings of the insurance product. Group meetings were held in the period from June to September in 2016, and to increase
participation in these sessions we incentivized attendance. During these sessions, concepts like total loss, trigger, long term
yield estimates and so on where presented and discussed. All participants in the study were informed that the indemnity-
based portion of the insurance would be triggered if actual yield fell below 65% of long-term yield estimates (also discussed
and validated locally). They also received information about index insurance and remote sensing of local rainfall. To further
increase the understanding of farmers we also organized meetings with group leaders to provide additional explanation
about the insurance product. After the sessions farmers participated in a lottery that determined treatment status – whether
they qualiﬁed for the free insurance conditional on purchase of certiﬁed seeds. 8 The lottery assigned 45% (55%) of the
farmers to the treatment (control) arm. The purchase of certiﬁed seeds and registration of insurance was veriﬁed in October
2016, after farmers started clearing land for planting. 
2.2. Experimental design 
Our initial sample frame consisted of 803 farmers, all of which members of one of the 40 farmer groups in Meru county,
Kenya. Treatment farmers received free insurance proportional to the amount of certiﬁed improved seeds purchased for
selected crops. During the end-line survey we were unable to retrieve 23 of the farmers, so the analysis is based on a sample
of 780. Additional analysis (summarized in Appendix Table A1 ) reveals that attrition is not correlated with treatment status
or baseline co-variates. We therefore treat it as random. 
There was some non-compliance. Of the control group, 34 farmers purchased the MPCI product anyway, paying the full
market price. This amounts to 8% of the subsample. Being absent or unavailable at the time of registration by APA insurance,
20 farmers from the treatment group who purchased improved seeds did not receive free insurance, amounting to 6% of this7 The design of the insurance product was done in close collaboration with Shalem Investments – a local aggregator in Meru, Kenya, providing certiﬁed 
inputs and trading (mainly) sorghum. 
8 Leaders of all 40 farmer groups were offered the conditional insurance package, and are not part of the study sample frame. This was to ensure ‘buy-in’ 
of leaders. 
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Table 2 
Balance tests. 
Variables Control Treatment Difference 
Male 0.085 0.089 0.004 
Age 46.373 45.994 −0.379 
Years of education 6.214 6.381 0.167 
Household size 5.599 5.725 0.126 
Catholic 0.313 0.358 0.045 
Wealth index 0.022 −0.027 −0.049 
Livestock tropical units 3.708 3.6885 −0.0195 
Bank account 0.242 0.286 0.044 ∗
Land farmed previous season 3.749 3.85 0.101 
Maize previous season 0.988 0.974 −0.014 
Sorghum previous season 0.065 0.081 0.016 
Sunﬂower previous season 0.021 0.015 −0.006 
Soya previous season 0.007 0.012 0.005 
Notes: OLS regressions of on Treatment and Constant. Constant reﬂects average baseline value of Control group; Con- 
stant plus Treatment reﬂects average baseline value of treatment group. Number of observations: 780 for all regressions. 
p -values based on cluster robust standard errors with farmer group as cluster(40). ∗p < 0.10; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 subsample. In addition, many farmers from the treatment group did not purchase improved seed (see below), and therefore
also qualify as non-compliers. In the analysis that follows we conservatively, considering all lottery winners as treated and
lottery losers as control—regardless of their ensuing insurance status. 9 
2.3. Descriptive statistics and balancing tests 
We check whether the randomisation worked by regressing the treatment dummy on baseline values of co-variates for
the sample of 780 farmers. Table 2 shows that the randomisation procedure worked as expected: at baseline, there are
hardly any signiﬁcant differences between winners and losers of the lottery. Farmers in the treatment group are slightly
more likely to have a bank account, signiﬁcant at the 10%, but the difference is small and we control for in our analysis.
Participants are mostly female, on average 46 years old, with 6 years of education, and living in a household with 6 mem-
bers. About one-third of our respondents is Catholic, the rest is from other Christian denominations. In the previous season
they farmed on average almost 4 acres of land, and owned almost 4 tropical livestock units (TLU). Almost every farmer
grew maize, and sorghum and sunﬂower were less important crops (grown by 7% and 2% of the farmers in our sample,
respectively). Soya was almost absent in the area. 
3. Identiﬁcation 
We present simple estimates of the impact of being offered the free insurance, bundled with improved seeds, on different
outcome variables. 10 The model we estimate read as follows: 
Y i = C + αT i + βX i + ε i (1)
Where Y i refers to a vector of dependent variables for respondent i, T i is the treatment dummy indicating whether
respondent i was offered free insurance (1 if they won the lottery, 0 otherwise), X i is a vector of controls at baseline, and
i is a random error term. While treatment status is orthogonal to baseline variables, controls are added to improve the
precision of our estimates. In all models we include the following controls: Age; Square of age; Male; Years of Education;
Household size; Catholic; Wealth index (based on assets); Livestock (expressed in TLUs); Bank account at baseline ; and whether
the farmer has access to only one input supplier (i.e. Shalem). We also include Unit Area of Insurance ﬁxed effects (or
‘region’ dummies). Eq. (1) is estimated using OLS, and we cluster standard errors at the farmer group level (of which there
are 40). 
4. Results 
In this section we present our main regression results, focusing on the impacts of the offer of the free multi-peril crop
insurance product on various dimensions of farm management as well as on WTP for the insurance product in the future. 9 As is often the case with individual-level interventions, it is possible that the treated colluded with control generating unwanted spill-overs. While we 
cannot exclude this entirely, we are conﬁdent that the extent of it is not driving our results. We believe that the combination of an index based component, 
with and indemnity component requiring ﬁeld veriﬁcations by qualiﬁed agronomists – as explicitly stressed by APA insurance – strongly disincentivized 
opportunistic behaviour across participants. 
10 Note that we do not estimate the effect of having insurance, but the effect of winning the lottery which gives access to free insurance. 
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Fig. 1. Uptake of certiﬁed seeds. 
Table 3 
Certiﬁed seed usage. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Uptake certiﬁed seeds Certiﬁed maize Certiﬁed sorghum Certiﬁed Sunﬂower Certiﬁed soya Total certiﬁed seeds 
Free insurance 0.146 ∗∗∗ 349.190 ∗∗∗ 40.713 ∗∗ 3.822 7.746 401.471 ∗∗∗
(0.045) (122.020) (16.450) (4.635) (5.816) (129.991) 
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UAI f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered s.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean control 
group 
0.449 855.414 24.021 4.234 6.509 890.179 
Observations 780 780 780 780 780 780 
R 2 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.11 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the farmer group level (40). Additional controls include Age, Age 2 , Male, Education years, Household 
size, Catholic, Wealth index, Livestock units, Bank account, One supplier only, and UAI ﬁxed effects. See Appendix Table A2 for a full detail of the control 
variables and their coeﬃcients. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4.1. Certiﬁed seeds usage 
The link between insurance and the purchase of improved seed is direct and automatic. Fig. 1 shows that the treatment
groups has a signiﬁcantly higher uptake rate of certiﬁed seeds as well as a signiﬁcantly higher total expenditure on seeds
(with a 95% conﬁdence interval clustered at the farmer group level). 
Using a Linear Probability Model (LPM) we ﬁnd that the likelihood of purchasing certiﬁed seeds increases by 14.6 per-
centage points (Column 1 of Table 3 ), suggesting that the farmers have a positive value for insurance. In the control arm,
some 45% of the farmers used improved seeds. This number was pushed up to nearly 60% due to the offer of free MPCI. 11 
This appears like a sizable treatment effect, of some 0.3 standard deviations from the control mean. However, it is evident
that many farmers still decided to not purchase any improved seeds. While latent demand for insurance is positive and
signiﬁcant, it is not suﬃciently large to sway all farmers to switch from traditional to modern varieties. 
Result 1: Uptake of modern varieties with subsidized insurance is greater than uptake of modern varieties without subsidized
insurance, suggesting positive willingness to pay for insurance. 
Columns 2–5 reports on estimates where we break down the analysis at the crop level. Treatment farmers were more
likely to purchase improved seeds of the two major crops in the area, sorghum and maize. They did not take the insurance
product as an opportunity to experiment with the lesser crops: soya and sunﬂower. 
Column 6 shows the impact on total improved seed expenditures (for all crops). Expenditures on certiﬁed seeds increased
by about 400 KSh, or by 0.26 standard deviations. This amounts to approximately one additional package of seed per person
in the treatment group (improved maize seed costs approximately KSh 40 0-50 0 per package), or just enough seed for one
quarter of an acre. This is a modest effect, indicating that farmers continue to grow traditional varieties as well. 
From Table 1 we know that the market price of the maize insurance product is KSh 609. It is important to observe that
for some 40% of the farmers in our sample, the combined value of improved seed and the insurance product is less than the11 This result is robust to using Probit and Logit estimators, with consistent signiﬁcance levels and marginal effects. 
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Table 4 
Investments in complementary inputs. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fertilizer Chemicals Machine rental Farm labor Total non-seed 
Free insurance 459.397 ∗∗ 89.282 556.721 ∗∗∗ 601.490 ∗∗ 1690.651 ∗∗∗
(222.405) (107.539) (173.599) (295.429) (475.321) 
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UAI f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered s.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean control group 3568.518 1118.825 2163.733 5732.316 12,579.34 
Observations 780 780 780 780 780 
R 2 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.22 0.23 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the farmer group level (40). Additional controls include Age, Age 2 , Male, Education years, 
Household size, Catholic, Wealth index, Livestock units, Bank account, One supplier only, and UAI ﬁxed effects. See Appendix Table A3 for 
a full detail of the control variables and their coeﬃcients. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
Table 5 
Land farmed. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Maize acres Sorghum acres Sunﬂower acres Soya acres Total land farmed Certiﬁed acres 
Free insurance 0.181 ∗∗ 0.107 ∗∗ 0.040 ∗∗ 0.049 ∗∗ 0.293 ∗∗ 0.332 ∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.045) (0.015) (0.024) (0.132) (0.096) 
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UAI f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered s.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean control group 1.25 0.13 0.04 0.01 2.55 0.55 
Observations 780 780 780 780 780 780 
R 2 0.20 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.24 0.14 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the farmer group level (40). Additional controls include Age, Age 2 , Male, Education 
years, Household size, Catholic, Wealth index, Livestock units, Bank account, One supplier only, and UAI ﬁxed effects. See Appendix 
Table A4 for a full detail of the control variables and their coeﬃcients. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 market price of seed (400 KSh) and therefore a priori (much) less than the market price of insurance. This suggests that
offering MPCI is unlikely to succeed as a market-based solution without subsidies (among inexperienced farmers). 
Additional regression results, including the full vector of control variables, are reported in Appendix Table A2 . We ﬁnd
that, in addition to the subsidy treatment, uptake of certiﬁed seed is also associated with education and wealth (both a
wealth index and livestock holdings). There are also signiﬁcant differences between regions, reﬂecting differences in agro-
ecological conditions or culture. 
4.2. Crowding-in complementary investments 
Does the increase in uptake of certiﬁed seeds, and the additional security offered by insurance, affect total investments in
complementary inputs not subject to the conditionality of improved seeds? In our experiment, risk reduction may come from
two sources – income stabilization due to the MPCI as well as reduced production risk due to the (drought-tolerant) seed
varieties. In addition, agronomic research suggests there may be production complementarities. Speciﬁcally, hybrid varieties
have a higher harvest index and put more of the nitrogen in added fertilizer into the grain. 
Table 4 shows a positive impact of the treatment on fertilizer use (Column 1), but not on pesticides and other chemicals
(Column 2). We also ﬁnd a large effect on investments in off-farm labour for planting, weeding, and harvesting (Column 3)
and machinery such as hired tractors (Column 4). Overall, the treatment effect on unconditional input investment amounts
to almost 1700 Ksh (0.15 standard deviations), signiﬁcant at the 1% level. These data suggest ‘crowding-in’ of complementary
inputs, consistent with Karlan et al. (2014) for insurance, and Emerick et al. (2016) for ﬂood-tolerant new rice varieties.
Below we speculate about the mechanism linking insurance to enhanced uptake of complementary inputs. 
Additional regression results are reported in Appendix Table A3 . As before, we ﬁnd a positive association between uptake
of inputs and our wealth proxies, and that the region dummies are signiﬁcant. In addition we ﬁnd that household size cor-
relates positively with the use of complementary inputs (perhaps reﬂecting complementarity in production between these
inputs and family labor), and that age is positively correlated with the use of fertilizers. 
4.3. Land use 
We next explore whether the intervention affected land use. Table 5 reveals positive and signiﬁcant impacts of the offer
on the acreage of the crops involved in the study (Columns 1–4) as well as on total area farmed (Column 5). Additional
regression results are presented in Table A4 . As before we ﬁnd that wealth, region dummies and education tend to enter
signiﬁcantly. Please cite this article as: E. Bulte, F. Cecchi and R. Lensink et al., Does bundling crop insurance with certiﬁed seeds 
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Table 6 
Farm investments per acre (excluding seeds). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fertilizer Chemicals Machine rental Farm labor Total non-seed 
Free insurance 32.663 −12.743 154.925 ∗ 326.130 ∗∗∗ 498.638 ∗
(152.283) (75.573) (77.449) (101.578) (253.546) 
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UAI f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered s.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean control group 2044.9 608.6 954.0 2317.5 5922.9 
Observations 780 780 780 780 780 
R 2 0.15 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.07 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the farmer group level (40). Additional controls include Age, Age 2 , Male, Education years, 
Household size, Catholic, Wealth index, Livestock units, Bank account, One supplier only, and UAI ﬁxed effects. See Appendix Table A5 for 
a full detail of the control variables and their coeﬃcients. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Our ﬁnding of expanded acreage is consistent with extensive margin results reported by Hill et al. (2019) for Bangladesh.
It is likely that part of the off-farm labour and machinery hired ( Table 4 ) are used to clear additional land. Column 6 shows
that newly-cultivated land was mostly used to plant certiﬁed seeds. Certiﬁed seeds therefore do not substitute non-certiﬁed
seeds. Rather, they seem to complement existing land allocation. 
But where does this additional land farmed come from? The ﬁnding that farmers in the treatment group cultivate an
extra one-quarter acre of land, suggests non-binding land constraints. We asked farmers in our sample whether credit,
and/or land availability were the main constraint to expanding their farming. While 62.4% responded that credit was a major
constraint for them, only 27.7% responded that land availability was a concern. This may be explained by the relatively low
population density in the area, with many farmers reporting they only farm a portion of the land they have farming rights
upon. It is also possible however that the additional land was farmed at the expense of land set aside for traditional crop
rotation. If so, the increase in farmed area may have unintended consequences in later seasons—limiting the land available
in the future under traditional rotation practices. 
Result 2: Subsidized insurance increases demand for complementary inputs such as fertilizer, machinery and hired labor, and
increases demand for land. Attenuating downside risk invites farm expansion. 
4.4. Intensity of land use 
How does this increase of land use reﬂect on the intensity of input use? We have documented that variable investments
in farm management as well as farm size increased as a result of the subsidized insurance offer. If insurance ‘crowds-out’
effort due to moral hazard, we should expect investments per unit of land may go down. However, regression results in
Table 6 , based on investments per acre, are inconsistent with such a perspective. Fertilizer and chemical use intensity is
unaffected. This ﬁnding allows us to speculate about the earlier ﬁnding that insurance crowds-in other inputs ( Section 4.2
above). The latter effect might have been driven by two non-exclusive mechanisms: an increase in the risk-adjusted return
to investment in modern inputs or production complementarities. Table 6 reveals the crowding-in effects originates from
taking additional land in production, rather than intensifying the management of existing land. Modern seed does not cause
farmers to apply more fertilizer on the cultivated land, as would have been the logical outcome for a positive cross-term of
certiﬁed seeds and fertilizer in the production function. We therefore speculate that the risk adjustment effect dominates.
However, additional data are necessary to disentangle these effects. 
Investments in off-farm labour and machinery are higher than among farmers in the control group. This is not unex-
pected if there are convex costs associated with taking more land in production. If taking new land in production requires
additional effort, then the average (per acre) cost of capital and labour cost for the farm go up. Total non-seed investments
per acre increase by about 500 KSh (Column 5)—signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Very few of the additional covariates, apart
from the region dummies, seem to have much explanatory power ( Table A5 ). However it is interesting to note that male-
headed households tend to farm their plots less intensively than female-headed households – they use less fertilizer and
chemicals per unit of land. 
Taking all the evidence on complementary inputs together we conclude the following: 
Result 3: Evidence for the intensity of intensive farm management is mixed, but overall input costs per unit of land increase.
There is no support for the claim that insurance invites moral hazard and crowds-out the use of complementary inputs. 
4.5. Willingness to pay 
Finally we test whether our intervention has affected willingness to pay (WTP) for future insurance—using an incentive
compatible BDM method. We presented farmers with an envelope containing a (discount) voucher for the purchase of in-Please cite this article as: E. Bulte, F. Cecchi and R. Lensink et al., Does bundling crop insurance with certiﬁed seeds 
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Table 7 
Willingness to pay for insurance ( Table A6 ). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS Winsorized Poisson Tobit 
Free insurance 40.451 ∗∗ 39.127 ∗∗ 0.078 ∗∗ 53.384 ∗∗
(19.124) (18.188) (0.037) (22.863) 
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UAI f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered s.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean control group 498.27 512.79 – –
Observations 780 780 780 780 
R 2 0.04 0.04 – –
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the farmer group level (40). Additional controls include Age, Age 2 , Male, Education years, 
Household size, Catholic, Wealth index, Livestock units, Bank account, One supplier only, and UAI ﬁxed effects. See Appendix Table A6 for 
a full detail of the control variables and their coeﬃcients. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗p 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 surance for one acre of certiﬁed maize land. 12 We offered the same MPCI product as before, but now limited the offer to
one acre and only for the most common crop (maize). Respondents were asked their maximum WTP for the voucher. If
their bid was higher than the price in the envelope, they could purchase insurance at the given envelope price. If their bid
was below the strike price they could not purchase the voucher. 
Regression results in Table 7 reveal two important results. First, WTP for the treated group exceeds that of the control
group (column 1). This suggests that the learning opportunities offered by subsidized insurance exceed any anchoring effect
on the past price of 0 Ksh. This results is robust to winsorizing the most extreme valuations (column 2), running a Poisson
speciﬁcation to take advantage of the count nature of data (column 3), as well as a censored Tobit to take into account
censoring of data above 10 0 0 KSh per policy (column 4). All results in Table 7 consistently point to an increase of WTP for
the treated of 7–8% compared to control. 
The second result is that the WTP of treated farmers is still too low for the market to take off––bids in the BDM are 11
percentage points below the true market value (column 1). According to our data, only 28% of the farmers in the control
group, and 33% of the farmers in the treatment group, are willing to pay the full premium of 609 KSh. Additional results
in Table A6 reveal a positive correlation between WTP at endline and our wealth index as well as our dummy for catholic
faith. 
Result 4: Short-term subsidies for agricultural insurance increase long-term demand for insurance. This suggests that the
learning effect of subsidies dominate any anchoring effects. 
5. Conclusions 
We use a randomised experiment in Kenya to analyse how smallholders respond to subsidized crop insurance condi-
tional on purchasing certiﬁed seeds. Our insurance product does not only offer index-type of protection against droughts,
it also contains an indemnity-based component offering protection against other shocks including pests and diseases. Basis
risk, broadly deﬁned, is therefore lower than with conventional index insurance products, suggesting that we offer a supe-
rior product from the farmers’ perspective. This is the ﬁrst paper that looks at the effect of an intervention that ‘bundles’
insurance with improved inputs. 
Our study complements the literature on the role that reducing downward income risks has on farming choices and
investments ( Emerick et al., 2016 ). Similar to Karlan et al. (2014) and Hill et al. (2019) , we ﬁnd that when uncertainty
constraints are relaxed by insurance coverage, farmers increase their appetite for innovation – in our case improved seed
varieties – and are able to ﬁnd resources to increase farm expenditures. Importantly, we are able to separate the increase in
expenditures that is due to increased land use, from intensiﬁcation. We ﬁnd that farmers respond by taking more land in
production and (hence) increasing expenditures on complementary inputs. 
As is well-known, the indemnity-based component of our insurance product may invite moral hazard—farmers claiming
damages following from the under-supply of protective effort. However, this is not what we observe in our data. The use
of complementary inputs per acre does not go down as a result of treatment. Of course it is possible that veriﬁcation costs12 We had four envelopes with four different strike prices: 480, 360, 240, and 120 KSh. 
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 of the indemnity-based component may impede further development of hybrid insurance products, even in the absence of
severe asymmetric information problems. 
Another important result of our study is that while farmers value insurance, they do not value it enough to support
market-based solutions. Willingness to pay for the hybrid product is positive, but falls short of the real market price for
many farmers. Indeed, even the combined value of modern seed and insurance is (far) below the market price of insurance.
Short-term subsidization goes some way towards ‘bridging the gap’ between willingness to pay and market prices, and may
help to develop future markets. We document that treated farmers place higher value on the insurance product than farmers
from the control group, suggesting the ‘learning effect’ of subsidies dominates any behavioural ‘anchoring effect’. However,
even after learning about the beneﬁts of insurance, we still ﬁnd that willingness to pay for insurance falls short of market
prices. Continued subsidization may therefore be necessary in order for this market to take off—which is of course not very
different from the way insurance markets in Western countries have developed ( Cole and Xiong, 2017 ). 
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Appendix 
Table A1 –A6 . Table A1 
Balance tests for attrition. 
Variables Sample Mean Attrition Mean 
Lottery won (treatment group) 780 0.44 23 0.52 −0.08 
Age 780 46.21 23 46.48 −0.27 
Male 780 0.09 23 0.17 −0.09 
Years of education 780 6.29 23 6.78 −0.49 
Household size 780 5.66 23 6.35 −0.69 ∗
Land available (previous year) 780 3.79 23 3.13 0.66 
Produced maize (previous year) 780 0.98 23 1.00 −0.02 
Produced Sorghum (previous year) 780 0.07 23 0.09 −0.02 
Produced soya (previous year) 780 0.01 23 0.00 0.01 
Produced sunﬂower (previous year) 780 0.02 23 0.00 0.02 
Bank account 780 0.26 23 0.22 0.04 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001. 
Table A2 
Certiﬁed seed usage. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Uptake certiﬁed seeds Certiﬁed maize Certiﬁed sorghum Certiﬁed Sunﬂower Certiﬁed soya Total certiﬁed seeds 
Free insurance 0.146 ∗∗∗ 349.190 ∗∗∗ 40.713 ∗∗ 3.822 7.746 401.471 ∗∗∗
(0.045) (122.020) (16.450) (4.635) (5.816) (129.991) 
Age 0.001 31.287 2.127 0.905 ∗ 0.188 34.508 
(0.007) (21.610) (2.445) (0.522) (1.042) (21.551) 
Age 2 0.000 −0.275 −0.020 −0.007 −0.002 −0.304 
(0.000) (0.224) (0.029) (0.005) (0.011) (0.222) 
Male 0.009 −21.283 160.069 ∗∗ 10.613 20.074 169.473 
(0.082) (249.477) (77.247) (12.358) (20.263) (257.109) 
Education years 0.026 ∗∗∗ 46.624 ∗∗ 2.041 1.289 ∗∗ 0.974 50.927 ∗∗∗
(0.007) (18.129) (1.781) (0.521) (1.138) (18.753) 
Household size −0.010 20.233 3.543 −1.252 1.261 23.785 
(0.010) (30.333) (4.073) (1.239) (0.863) (30.246) 
Catholic −0.018 −169.774 28.567 −6.544 −11.461 ∗∗ −159.212 
(0.042) (128.175) (23.150) (5.688) (5.306) (131.696) 
Wealth index 0.030 224.918 ∗∗ 2.412 7.073 ∗∗∗ 4.852 239.254 ∗∗
(0.024) (87.942) (9.244) (2.589) (4.385) (89.266) 
( continued on next page ) 
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Table A2 ( continued ) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Uptake certiﬁed seeds Certiﬁed maize Certiﬁed sorghum Certiﬁed Sunﬂower Certiﬁed soya Total certiﬁed seeds 
Livestock units 0.004 63.076 ∗∗∗ 2.966 −0.821 0.007 65.228 ∗∗∗
(0.005) (17.432) (2.227) (0.539) (0.631) (18.836) 
Bank account 0.079 ∗ 190.136 −1.565 2.304 2.174 193.048 
(0.044) (154.068) (18.831) (4.357) (6.180) (155.072) 
One supplier −0.120 ∗ −359.790 −17.819 15.965 ∗∗∗ 5.427 −356.218 
(0.063) (218.194) (22.822) (5.696) (4.442) (213.856) 
Imenti 0.032 −447.342 ∗∗ 3.802 −17.234 ∗∗∗ −9.012 −469.787 ∗∗
(0.057) (214.203) (20.532) (5.422) (6.113) (212.244) 
Kaare −0.016 −612.022 ∗∗∗ 1.311 31.734 ∗∗∗ 111.445 ∗∗∗ −467.533 ∗∗
(0.044) (211.192) (18.753) (3.321) (6.474) (203.159) 
Lailuba 0.016 −123.802 −60.545 ∗ −5.111 0.774 −188.683 
(0.051) (250.940) (31.607) (5.204) (8.602) (221.161) 
Tharaka −0.040 −284.246 −10.950 −3.133 6.962 ∗ −291.367 
(0.078) (273.896) (20.458) (2.188) (3.864) (272.782) 
Constant 0.227 −312.274 −79.437 −18.620 −14.561 −424.891 
(0.182) (502.027) (47.331) (12.265) (26.473) (514.471) 
Observations 780 780 780 780 780 780 
Clusters 40 40 40 40 40 40 
R 2 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.11 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the farmer group level. 
∗ p < 0.10. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
Table A3 
Investments in complementary inputs. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fertilizer Chemicals Machine rental Farm labor Total non-seed 
Free insurance 459.397 ∗∗ 89.282 556.721 ∗∗∗ 601.490 ∗∗ 1690.651 ∗∗∗
(222.405) (107.539) (173.599) (295.429) (475.321) 
Age 93.486 ∗∗ −7.986 −7.585 11.755 87.701 
(45.187) (27.894) (33.560) (82.152) (125.010) 
Age 2 −1.146 ∗∗ 0.181 0.014 −0.442 −1.379 
(0.461) (0.314) (0.342) (0.854) (1.334) 
Male −719.098 392.807 536.833 2189.794 2409.062 
(545.757) (357.514) (545.338) (2129.088) (2842.945) 
Education years 30.246 35.411 9.620 20.374 96.545 
(35.195) (23.746) (25.257) (99.683) (141.851) 
Household size 118.686 ∗ 3.900 155.553 ∗∗ 192.777 ∗ 470.387 ∗∗∗
(63.229) (28.303) (60.140) (95.689) (165.745) 
Catholic −615.346 ∗∗ 90.886 −83.723 −453.462 −1048.019 
(283.012) (238.012) (221.304) (406.076) (802.511) 
Wealth index 633.854 ∗∗ 266.279 ∗∗∗ 382.334 ∗∗∗ 758.697 ∗∗ 2049.348 ∗∗∗
(264.135) (94.708) (132.580) (332.815) (570.758) 
Livestock units 135.876 ∗∗ 46.535 121.237 ∗∗∗ 744.641 ∗∗∗ 1044.770 ∗∗∗
(58.405) (30.855) (23.195) (175.476) (153.454) 
Bank account 491.169 171.942 101.588 1285.739 2057.729 
(453.260) (194.275) (291.092) (815.727) (1380.547) 
One supplier −845.509 −92.285 172.595 3.861 −750.498 
(739.684) (210.248) (404.788) (711.595) (1701.895) 
Imenti −157.463 −70.704 −1693.314 ∗∗∗ −1355.786 −3276.391 ∗
(942.176) (190.556) (446.614) (882.579) (1702.325) 
Kaare −2494.881 ∗∗∗ 1501.881 ∗∗∗ 432.188 2178.225 ∗∗ 1143.764 
(559.717) (209.138) (319.146) (827.084) (1646.069) 
Lailuba 414.054 −662.894 ∗∗∗ −1615.579 ∗∗∗ −1591.792 ∗∗ −3442.487 ∗∗
(627.726) (184.456) (359.854) (601.480) (1410.469) 
Tharaka 799.949 358.334 −1025.915 ∗∗∗ −628.163 −485.178 
(614.088) (280.881) (358.931) (861.889) (1544.120) 
Constant 770.099 540.003 1592.762 ∗∗ 2330.593 5286.170 ∗
(1107.687) (601.948) (757.374) (1950.820) (2803.346) 
Observations 780 780 780 780 780 
Clusters 40 40 40 40 40 
R 2 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.22 0.23 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the farmer group level. 
∗ p < 0.10. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
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Table A4 
Land farmed. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Maize acres Sorghum acres Sunﬂower acres Soya acres Total land farmed Certiﬁed acres 
Free insurance 0.181 ∗∗ 0.107 ∗∗ 0.040 ∗∗ 0.049 ∗∗ 0.293 ∗∗ 0.332 ∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.045) (0.015) (0.024) (0.132) (0.096) 
Age 0.015 0.008 0.002 0.006 ∗ 0.020 0.024 ∗
(0.017) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.042) (0.014) 
Age 2 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 ∗ −0.000 −0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.224 0.350 0.012 −0.046 1.173 ∗ 0.326 
(0.188) (0.217) (0.031) (0.037) (0.627) (0.226) 
Education years 0.004 0.012 ∗∗ 0.005 ∗ 0.006 0.033 0.037 ∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.031) (0.013) 
Household size 0.052 ∗∗ 0.018 0.001 0.000 0.090 ∗∗∗ 0.022 
(0.022) (0.013) (0.005) (0.003) (0.032) (0.020) 
Catholic −0.126 0.081 −0.033 0.014 −0.018 −0.017 
(0.093) (0.083) (0.020) (0.028) (0.233) (0.113) 
Wealth index 0.204 ∗∗∗ −0.008 0.011 0.012 0.355 ∗∗∗ 0.136 ∗∗
(0.058) (0.031) (0.012) (0.026) (0.118) (0.059) 
Livestock units 0.112 ∗∗∗ 0.008 −0.000 0.005 0.209 ∗∗∗ 0.055 ∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.028) (0.020) 
Bank account 0.105 0.096 ∗ 0.000 −0.035 0.400 ∗ 0.142 
(0.101) (0.056) (0.025) (0.022) (0.203) (0.093) 
One supplier 0.209 ∗ −0.092 0.102 ∗∗∗ 0.008 0.245 −0.036 
(0.113) (0.082) (0.028) (0.017) (0.274) (0.127) 
Imenti −0.424 ∗∗∗ −0.150 ∗ −0.050 0.003 −1.054 ∗∗∗ −0.271 ∗∗
(0.113) (0.075) (0.037) (0.024) (0.272) (0.103) 
Kaare −0.146 ∗ 0.086 0.164 ∗∗∗ 0.144 ∗∗∗ 0.656 ∗∗∗ 0.103 
(0.076) (0.079) (0.016) (0.011) (0.164) (0.086) 
Lailuba −0.295 ∗∗ −0.263 ∗∗ −0.019 −0.013 −0.922 ∗∗∗ −0.151 
(0.118) (0.097) (0.016) (0.019) (0.192) (0.106) 
Tharaka −0.078 −0.124 −0.019 0.040 ∗∗ −0.425 −0.141 
(0.139) (0.080) (0.014) (0.017) (0.286) (0.153) 
Constant 0.135 −0.267 ∗ −0.096 −0.201 0.411 −0.627 ∗
(0.396) (0.153) (0.065) (0.120) (1.001) (0.344) 
Observations 780 780 780 780 780 780 
Clusters 40 40 40 40 40 40 
R 2 0.20 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.24 0.14 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the farmer group level. 
∗ p < 0.10. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
Table A5 
Farm investments per acre (excluding seeds). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fertilizer Chemicals Machine rental Hiring of labour Total non-seed 
Free insurance 44.467 −11.293 154.919 ∗ 320.002 ∗∗∗ 505.880 ∗
(157.010) (74.618) (78.044) (100.284) (259.953) 
Age −71.524 −30.468 −26.768 −62.041 ∗ −190.726 ∗
(73.868) (20.913) (16.638) (36.316) (104.616) 
Age 2 0.626 0.374 0.216 0.438 1.652 
(0.815) (0.232) (0.157) (0.361) (1.116) 
Male −1019.997 ∗∗∗ −313.925 ∗∗ 141.191 34.784 −1157.635 ∗
(353.901) (121.732) (199.910) (253.115) (586.219) 
Education years 5.969 9.066 −20.005 −29.119 −33.671 
(26.815) (18.301) (16.100) (27.452) (51.345) 
Household size −40.736 −35.506 10.949 2.515 −62.880 
(36.493) (22.736) (20.376) (34.165) (71.746) 
Catholic −372.071 ∗∗ 141.646 −64.536 −130.197 −424.314 
(169.403) (142.961) (70.377) (165.482) (329.194) 
Wealth index −104.058 64.756 47.644 164.835 ∗ 174.931 
(115.899) (42.390) (57.746) (91.150) (205.306) 
Livestock units −41.382 ∗∗ −11.312 0.501 40.627 ∗ −12.006 
(15.920) (10.176) (8.616) (22.092) (36.368) 
( continued on next page ) 
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Table A5 ( continued ) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fertilizer Chemicals Machine rental Hiring of labour Total non-seed 
Bank account 35.053 −108.096 38.159 −5.487 −36.655 
(154.124) (73.505) (127.495) (200.567) (428.140) 
One supplier −345.519 −51.777 −25.715 −190.797 −613.637 
(317.300) (86.685) (136.197) (235.094) (583.976) 
Imenti 861.697 ∗ 204.718 ∗∗ −385.828 370.253 1049.235 
(504.102) (82.387) (235.053) (307.424) (704.515) 
Kaare −1010.940 ∗∗∗ 336.859 ∗∗∗ −272.078 ∗∗ −268.129 −1335.486 ∗∗
(223.380) (98.963) (133.311) (264.162) (555.301) 
Lailuba 1062.314 ∗∗∗ −171.332 ∗∗ −637.666 ∗∗∗ 116.378 371.713 
(390.093) (75.012) (182.199) (198.397) (671.288) 
Tharaka 1121.200 ∗∗∗ 412.672 ∗∗∗ −326.932 ∗∗ −101.230 1106.669 ∗
(373.275) (138.669) (138.968) (297.116) (621.194) 
Constant 4125.239 ∗∗ 1252.568 ∗∗∗ 1973.955 ∗∗∗ 4331.092 ∗∗∗ 11,679.670 ∗∗∗
(1653.317) (422.874) (435.538) (807.817) (2500.683) 
Observations 780 780 780 780 780 
Clusters 40 40 40 40 40 
R 2 0.15 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.07 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the farmer group level. 
∗ p < 0.10. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
Table A6 
Willingness to pay. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS Winsorized Poisson Tobit 
Free insurance 40.451 ∗∗ 39.127 ∗∗ 0.078 ∗∗ 53.384 ∗∗
(19.124) (18.188) (0.037) (22.863) 
Age −6.440 −6.830 −0.012 −9.146 
(4.598) (4.513) (0.009) (5.877) 
Age 2 0.067 0.069 0.000 0.095 
(0.051) (0.049) (0.000) (0.064) 
Male 42.625 49.383 0.076 48.580 
(40.819) (38.597) (0.069) (54.879) 
Education years 0.374 −0.733 0.001 0.158 
(3.760) (3.497) (0.007) (4.461) 
Household size −2.238 −1.406 −0.004 −2.278 
(6.079) (5.791) (0.012) (7.542) 
Catholic 48.885 ∗∗ 47.064 ∗∗ 0.093 ∗∗ 62.750 ∗∗
(21.578) (20.258) (0.039) (27.323) 
Wealth index 29.056 ∗ 28.030 ∗∗ 0.056 ∗∗ 37.058 ∗∗
(14.641) (13.351) (0.027) (17.481) 
Livestock units 4.817 4.396 0.008 5.991 
(3.804) (3.600) (0.006) (4.845) 
Bank account 11.311 10.194 0.022 11.331 
(26.108) (24.753) (0.049) (32.547) 
One supplier 41.842 33.970 0.081 43.956 
(27.424) (25.629) (0.054) (33.392) 
Imenti 7.261 11.863 0.015 18.049 
(31.190) (28.622) (0.060) (37.375) 
Kaare −15.541 −14.276 −0.030 −11.074 
(22.149) (21.242) (0.044) (26.957) 
Lailuba −15.896 −16.155 −0.035 −14.988 
(43.298) (39.548) (0.084) (52.846) 
Tharaka 1.368 −4.292 0.003 −0.929 
(24.164) (23.300) (0.049) (30.839) 
Constant 595.999 ∗∗∗ 631.970 ∗∗∗ 6.400 ∗∗∗ 671.283 ∗∗∗
(103.449) (102.064) (0.193) (131.866) 
Observations 780 780 780 780 
Clusters 40 40 40 40 
R 2 0.04 0.04 – –
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the farmer group level. 
∗ p < 0.10. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
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